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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2009, a federal circuit court of appeals used an
appellate mechanism that has been described as “a dead letter.”1
Given its dead-letter status, it should come as little surprise that
“there are few lawyers (and perhaps few circuit judges) who even
know it remains an option.”2 Despite this reality, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, utilized Supreme Court Rule 19,
which provides: “A United States court of appeals may certify to [the
Supreme Court] a question or proposition of law on which it seeks
instruction for the proper decision of a case.”3 The Fifth Circuit was
divided evenly over the proper resolution of a legal issue, so it
certified a question of law to the Supreme Court.4 One can only
speculate as to whether the Fifth Circuit appreciated at the time it
issued the certified question5 that it was employing an appellate
mechanism that the Supreme Court has discouraged, and that
circuit courts have rarely implemented in the last fifty years.6
Despite these hostilities, certification has existed in federal
statutory law for more than two centuries.7 Notwithstanding
1. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1712 (2000). 
2. Id. 
3. SUP. CT. R. 19. 
4. United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 571 (5th Cir. 2009) (“What statute of limitations
applies to a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 for a kidnapping offense that occurred in 1964
but was not indicted until 2007?”). 
5. But see id. at 572 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“The likelihood of the Court’s accepting
certification, based on past usage, is virtually nil.”). 
6. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.3, at 679 (5th ed. 2007) (“The
Supreme Court is generally reluctant to accept matters via certification.”); EUGENE GRESSMAN
ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 597 (9th ed. 2007) (stating that the Supreme Court disfavors
certification); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court
in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1450 (2009) (concluding that the Justices
discourage certified questions just as much as they discourage petitions for writs of certiorari). 
In the last fifty years, the Court has granted only three certificates. See Iran Nat’l Airlines
Corp. v. Marschalk Co., 453 U.S. 919 (1981); Moody v. Albermarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622
(1974) (per curiam); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). 
7. Congress first authorized certification in 1802. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2
Stat. 156, 159. More surprising is the fact that certification has existed longer—approximately
ninety years longer—than the writ of certiorari, the most widely used appellate mechanism
today. See generally Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. 
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certification’s deep historical roots, few lawyers, legal scholars, and
judges know that it exists.8 Moreover, despite a dearth of academic
literature and recent case law on the topic, certification remains a
relevant aspect of federal appellate practice.9
By entering the somewhat dormant academic debate on certifica-
tion, this Note seeks to assess the history, constitutionality, and
viability of certification. Part I provides a historical overview of the
arguments that Congress, the Supreme Court, and legal scholars
have advanced to justify certification’s inception and continued
existence. Part II addresses whether certification is wholly constitu-
tional or whether, even if it is constitutional, it has been unconstitu-
tionally applied. Part III evaluates the present and future viability
of certification. Ultimately, this Note concludes that certification
remains a viable, albeit broken, appellate mechanism. In order to
maximize the benefits that it has to offer, the Supreme Court must
reevaluate and revise certification’s place in federal appellate
procedure. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CERTIFICATION
In order to assess the future viability of certification, one must
first understand and appreciate the role that certification has
played in federal appellate procedure.10 Through an examination of
statutory law and judicial interpretation, Part I tracks the expan-
sion, limitation, and transformation of certification from its initial
conception through its multiple revisions. This Part also examines
8. See supra text accompanying note 2. Much of what has been written on certification
can be found in only a handful of academic pieces. See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard, Certified
Questions in the Supreme Court: In Defense of an Option, 83 DICK. L. REV. 31 (1979); James
W. Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1 (1949); Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s Certified
Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 483 (2010); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme
Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010). Even
one of the leading case books on federal court procedure consigns its discussion of certification
to only one page. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS 1054 (12th ed. 2008). 
9. But see Nielson, supra note 8, at 487 (declaring the death of certification after the
Supreme Court’s refusal to answer the Fifth Circuit’s certified question in Seale). 
10. For a more extensive historical treatment of certification, see generally Hartnett,
supra note 1, passim, and Moore & Vestal, supra note 8, at 10-19.
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the nexus between the Supreme Court and certification, and ana-
lyzes the Justices’ reasons for certification’s continued use. 
A. Certification’s Inception: Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits 
Certification has deep historical roots that extend as far back as
1802.11 At the time, there were only six circuit courts, and each
individual court “consist[ed] of the justice of the supreme court
residing within the said circuit, and the district judge of the district
where such court [was] holden.”12 Because these courts were com-
posed of only two judges, a district judge and a Supreme Court
Justice, the sitting judges frequently did not agree on the appropri-
ate holding.13 In response to this problem, Congress enacted the
following law:
[W]henever any question shall occur before a circuit court, upon
which the opinions of the judges shall be opposed, the point upon
which the disagreement shall happen, shall, during the same
term, upon the request of either party, or their counsel, be stated
under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of
the court, to the supreme court, at their next session to be held
thereafter; and shall, by the said court, be finally decided.14
Congress intended that circuit courts would use certification to
resolve intra-circuit splits.15 Congress, however, in rectifying one
problem, created another: due to the frequency with which the
circuit courts split,16 certification had the potential to burden the
Supreme Court with certified questions. To guard against this, the
Court began to place restrictions on certification despite the fact
11. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 678. 
12. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157.
13. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 106, at 780
(6th ed. 2002) (finding that judges would frequently “disagree deliberately in order to bring
a question to the Supreme Court”). 
14. Act of Apr. 29, 1802 § 6, 2 Stat. at 159. 
15. This argument depends on one defining an intra-circuit split as a conflict between the
two judges sitting on a circuit court. This definition, however, is dated given the current
makeup of the circuit court system. For a modern definition of an intra-circuit split, see infra
note 124.
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
2011] CERTIFICATION IN FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE 2029
that these restrictions were absent from the statute.17 For example,
the Court dismissed those questions that were “too imperfectly
stated to enable [the Supreme Court] to pronounce any opinion upon
them.”18 The Court also accepted only questions of law, dismissing
those questions in which the facts were still at issue.19 Similarly, the
Court restricted certified questions to a “single and material point”
of law, reasoning that when a certificate brings up the whole case,
“it would, in effect, be the exercise of original, rather than appellate
jurisdiction.”20 Acting under congressional silence, the Court has
repeatedly either upheld or expanded these restrictions.21
B. Certification and the Judiciary Act of 1891: Resolving       
Inter-Circuit Splits
Despite the Supreme Court’s restrictions on certification, it was
still overburdened with an ever-increasing caseload.22 In response
to this growing problem, Congress sought to revise the structure
and procedures of the federal judiciary, which it did in 1891.23 As
part of these revisions, Congress established the permanent circuit
17. The statute, moreover, gives the Court no authority to create such restrictions. 
18. Perkins v. Hart, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 237, 237 (1826). 
19. E.g., Adams, Cunningham & Co. v. Jones, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 207, 213 (1838) (“[T]o
express an opinion upon the whole facts of the case, instead of particular points of law
growing out of the same ... [is] a practice which is not deemed by the majority of the Court to
be correct, under the act of congress on this subject.”).
20. White v. Turk, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 238, 239 (1838). Part II discusses whether the Court,
in deciding a certified question that is dispositive of the case, exercises original jurisdiction.
For now, it is simply important to note that the Court understood the jurisdictional and
constitutional issues that may arise with respect to certification’s use. 
21. E.g., Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 248 U.S. 178, 179 (1918) (dismissing
the certificate because “the statements amount but to a narrative of facts mixed with
questions of law so interblended ... as to cause it to be impossible to conclude as to either the
law or the facts without a separation of the two”); Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U.S.
266, 269 (1893) (dismissing the certificate because “[i]t does not specifically set forth the
question or questions to be answered, and ... it does not state that instruction is desired for
proper decision of such question or questions”). 
22. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650 (“By 1888, the Court was more than three years
behind in its work, and when the 1890 Term opened, the Court had reached the absurd total
of 1800 cases on its appellate docket—and was obligated to decide them all.”) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted). 
23. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (“An act to establish circuit courts of
appeals and to define and regulate in certain cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States, and for other purposes.”). 
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courts of appeals to act as intermediate appellate courts between
the Supreme Court and the district courts.24 Congress also retained
certification, and authorized the Court to “require that the whole
record and cause ... be sent up to it for its consideration, and
thereupon shall decide the whole matter in controversy in the same
manner as if it had been brought there for review by writ of error or
appeal.”25 This revision, surprisingly, was met with little debate. 
When the Judiciary Act was first introduced in Congress in 1888,
the legislation “provided for circuit court certification of sufficiently
important legal questions.”26 After its passage in the House in 1889,
the bill authorized the circuit courts in diversity cases “to certify
novel, difficult, or important questions, and required circuit courts
to certify any question that had been decided differently in another
circuit court.”27 The purpose of certification, however, remained an
issue for debate. Originally, certification was established for the
purpose of resolving intra-circuit splits between the two judges
sitting on a circuit court.28 But proponents of the 1888 legislation
asserted that the revised purpose of certification was to resolve
inter-circuit splits.29 The legislation’s sponsor, Senator William
Evarts, supported this latter view in the congressional debates, con-
tending that certification would “guard against diversity of judg-
ment in these different courts.”30
At the time the Senate considered the legislation, the Senate
Judiciary Committee requested the Justices’ views on the “various
proposals for relieving the Court’s workload,” one of which included
a proposal to establish permanent intermediate appellate courts of
24. Id. § 2, 26 Stat. at 826. 
25. Id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828. The Court had previously held that the certification statute
did not authorize it to order up a case to decide the entire matter in controversy. Rather, the
Court reasoned that it was restricted to deciding only certified questions of law. See, e.g.,
Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 577 (1930) (“[T]his
Court uniformly ruled that it could not entertain the certifications unless they were of distinct
questions of law and not of the whole case.”). 
26. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1651.
27. Id.
28. See supra Part I.A.
29. See Comment, Federal Appellate Practice—Certified Questions on a Division of
Opinion Between Two Panels of a Court of Appeals Dismissed, 43 IOWA L. REV. 432, 436 (1958)
(“The sponsor of the ... Bill ... indicated that diversity of judgment between different circuit
courts of appeals would be a proper situation for certification.”). 
30. 21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. Evarts). 
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appeals.31 Voicing their support, the Justices, in a letter to the
Committee, noted “their approval of eleven particular features of the
various proposals.”32 The Justices were particularly interested in
“the provision that certain cases were ‘not to be brought to the
Supreme Court ... unless the Court of Appeal, or two judges thereof,
certify that the question involved is of such novelty, difficulty or
importance as to require a final decision by the Supreme Court.’”33
Although the Justices thought that certification would be especially
useful in resolving inter-circuit splits,34 they would ultimately re-
strict its use in cases implicating such divisions. 
C. Certification and the Judiciary Act of 1925: Reducing the
Court’s Docket
Certification achieved its ultimate design in the Judiciary Act of
1925, which “amend[ed] the Judicial Code” and “further define[d]
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeals and of the Supreme
Court.”35 The legislation’s sponsor, Senator Albert Cummins, ac-
knowledged that revisions to the Judicial Code were necessary to
“restrict or reduce the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
... in order to enable it fairly to meet the demands that are made
upon it.”36 For example, when Congress enacted the legislation, the
31. The Supreme Court became involved with the legislation during a dinner party hosted
by Chief Justice Melville Fuller and attended by the Justices and seven members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1651. 
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 228-29 n.36
(1964)).
34. Id. (“But any question shall be so certified upon which there has been a different
decision in another circuit.” (quoting MURPHY, supra note 33, at 228-29 n.36)). 
35. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 239, 43 Stat. 936, 936. Specifically, this Act provided:
In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of appeals, or in the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia, the court at any time may certify to the
Supreme Court of the United States any questions or propositions of law
concerning which instructions are desired for the proper decision of the cause;
and thereupon the Supreme Court may either give binding instructions on the
questions and propositions certified or may require that the entire record in the
cause be sent up for its consideration, and thereupon shall decide the whole
matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought there by
writ of error or appeal.
Id. ch. 229, 43 Stat. at 938. 
36. 66 CONG. REC. 2752 (1925) (statement of Sen. Cummins). 
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Court was “15 or 18 months behind in its work.”37 In relieving the
Court of its ever-increasing caseload, the legislation “restricted the
right of appeal to the Supreme Court to a very limited area involv-
ing constitutionality of statutes.”38 Certification, however, remained
intact, largely because Congress sought to limit “the number of
cases in which there is an appeal or writ of error as of right, and
increase those in which only a certiorari or a certificate can bring
the case before the Supreme Court.”39 Ultimately, Congress deter-
mined that certification’s “obligatory review”40 would “furnish ample
opportunity for all cases to go from the circuit court of appeals to the
Supreme Court.”41 
 Although Congress was primarily responsible for drafting this
legislation, the Court was given the opportunity to weigh in on the
proposed revisions. During congressional hearings on certification,
Justice Willis Van Devanter stated that “[t]he present statute has
proved to be a useful one” because it authorized the circuit courts of
appeals “to avail themselves of decisions on distinct questions of law
unassociated with all the other complexities of the case, and then to
apply them instead of going ahead and making a decision and
having the whole case come up to us.”42 The validity of this observa-
tion, however, depends on the logical assumption that answering a
certified question is likely to expend less of the Court’s limited
judicial resources than would a decision of the entire case on appeal.
That observation is true if, for example, a circuit court of appeals,
confronted with a pressing legal question that it is unable to
answer, issues a certified question to the Supreme Court. The Court
answers the question, which just so happens to be dispositive of the
case pending before the circuit court. The circuit court, in turn,
applies the answer in its judgment. This judgment may have
implications in other circuit or district courts faced with the same
or similar legal question. In this scenario, the Supreme Court’s
37. Id.
38. Comment, supra note 29, at 433. 
39. H.R. REP. NO. 68-1075, at 3 (1925).
40. Comment, supra note 29, at 433. 
41. S. REP. NO. 68-362, at 3 (1924). 
42. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 8206, 68th Cong. 15, 29 (1924)
(statement of J. Van Devanter). 
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answer to the certified question effectively limits the number of
appeals to both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.
Despite Justice Van Devanter’s assurances that certification
would “always [be] granted when there is a conflict between courts
of appeals and would always be granted when there was an
arguable constitutional claim, [the Justices] never explained what
the supposedly recognized principles were” that would guide them
in granting or dismissing a certificate.43 Without such “governing
principles,” the Court, by dismissing valid certificates, effectively
“achieved absolute and arbitrary discretion over the bulk of its
docket.”44 In fact, the Court sought to increase this discretion “by
practically eliminating the certification power of courts of appeals.”45
The Judiciary Act of 1925, which Congress enacted to reduce the
caseload of the Supreme Court and to furnish the circuit courts of
appeals with greater control, conferred to the Court near complete
discretion over its docket, thereby “depriv[ing] the lower courts of
their promised role”46 and contravening the legislation’s purpose. As
the decreasing number of certificates issued by the circuit courts
demonstrates, the Court has exercised such complete control and
discretion over its docket that it has all but eliminated certification’s
use.47
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CERTIFICATION 
In order to assess the future viability of certification, one must
determine whether certification, as authorized by Congress or as
applied by the federal courts, is constitutional. For example, does
Congress, through certification, usurp the judicial power of the
Supreme Court by vesting control over the Court’s docket in the
43. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1705. 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1710. Then-Professor Frankfurter and Professor Landis asserted that, in spite
of the Court’s hostility to certification, “questions certified must be answered.” Id. (quoting
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1930)). 
47. From 1927 to 1936, the circuit courts issued seventy-two certificates. Id. at 1710-12.
This number dropped to twenty a decade later, and the decline continued; from 1946 to 2009,
the Supreme Court granted certificates in only four cases. Id.; see also Nielson, supra note 8,
at 486-87.
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circuit courts of appeals?48 The more important question, however,
is whether the Supreme Court acts within its constitutionally dele-
gated authority when it grants a certificate if the answer to the
certified question is dispositive of the entire case pending before the
lower court exercising original jurisdiction.49 In such cases, does the
Court implicitly exercise original jurisdiction in contravention of the
Constitution? Is the federal statute authorizing certification con-
stitutionally valid because it permits the Court to choose between
a constitutionally permissible assertion of appellate jurisdiction and
a constitutionally impermissible assertion of original jurisdiction? 
A. The Supreme Court’s Original and Appellate Jurisdictions 
In addressing the constitutional issues that are implicated when
the Supreme Court answers a certified question, one must first
understand when the Court is permitted or required to exercise
jurisdiction over a case. Section 2 of Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion authorizes the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party.”50 In those few enumerated
instances, the Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction and acts as the
court of first instance;51 that is, the Supreme Court is the only court
that has the authority to render a decision in the matter.52 When
the Supreme Court is constitutionally forbidden from exercising
original jurisdiction, the Court is authorized to exercise appellate
jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”53
48. For an answer to this question, see Bernard, supra note 8, at 44. 
49. Moore and Vestal raise a similar question, which they answer in the negative. Moore
& Vestal, supra note 8, at 34-35 (“But where the certificate meets the established standards
as to operative facts and distinct and definite questions of law the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction is invoked, and no valid objection can, therefore, be based upon the decisive
character of the certified questions.”). 
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
51. Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity,
Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 77 (2007) (“Article III, § 1 and Article III, § 2, cl.
1 together define the one supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Article III, § 2, cl. 2 divides that pre-
defined jurisdiction between matters to be decided by the Court at first instance and matters
to be decided by the Court on appeal.”). 
52. Id. at 77-78. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Although the Constitution confers upon Congress the authority
to regulate any matter pertaining to the Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion, it does not grant the same authority with respect to the Court’s
original jurisdiction.54 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court emphati-
cally rejected the use of congressional power to modify the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction.55 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
John Marshall expounded, “If congress remains at liberty to give
this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where
the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution
of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without sub-
stance.”56 The Court ultimately concluded that the “obvious mean-
ing” of Article III prohibits Congress from either adding to or
detracting from the Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction.57 To
hold otherwise, the clause would become “inoperative” and would
have little effect in limiting the power of Congress to manipulate the
jurisdiction of the Court, either by granting original jurisdiction
when none exists or by removing original jurisdiction in contraven-
tion of the Constitution.58
Although certification is primarily used as an appellate mecha-
nism, there are rare instances when the Court answers a certified
question that is dispositive of the entire case pending before the
lower court exercising original jurisdiction.59 As Parts II.B and II.C
demonstrate, whether the Court in such cases implicitly and
unconstitutionally exercises original jurisdiction depends, to some
extent, on how one defines original jurisdiction.
B. Answering a Certified Question that Is Dispositive of the Entire
Case
The Supreme Court in Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v.
United States answered a certified question dispositive of an entire
54. Id. 
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (“Congress have not power to give original
jurisdiction to the supreme court in other cases than those described in the constitution.”). 
56. Id. at 174. 
57. Id. at 175. 
58. Id.
59. See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946); Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co.
v. United States, 281 U.S. 572 (1930). 
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case.60 In 1930, the Court of Claims, exercising original jurisdiction,
certified a question concerning an interpretation of the Revenue
Acts of 1917 and 1918.61 The Supreme Court originally dismissed
the certificate because it “embrace[d] the whole case, and so could
not be answered consistently with the applicable statute or with the
constitutional limitations on our jurisdiction.”62 Constitutionally, the
Court would have been unable to entertain the certificate because,
in so doing, it would have exercised “original jurisdiction ... contrary
to the constitutional provision.”63 Statutorily, the Court would have
been unable to grant the certificate because “the statute permit[ted]
a certification only of definite and distinct questions of law.”64 As the
Court correctly concluded, “it could not entertain the certifications
unless they were of distinct questions of law and not of the whole
case, for otherwise it would be assuming original jurisdiction
withheld from it by the Constitution.”65 Despite these findings, the
Supreme Court vacated its original order, granted the certificate,
and answered the certified question.66 This change of heart rested,
in large part, on the Court’s determination that “the certification of
a definite question of law is not rendered objectionable merely
because the answer may be decisive of the case.”67 Although the
Court answered the certified question that was dispositive of the
entire case pending before the Court of Claims, it did not consider
that such an approach could amount to a constitutionally impermis-
sible extension of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. 
The same issue arose in United States v. Rice.68 In Rice, the cir-
cuit court certified a question as to “whether [the circuit court] may,
by mandamus, review the judgment of the District Court for
60. Wheeler, 281 U.S. 572.
61. See id. at 575-76 (“[I]s the transportation of the lumber to the place of delivery a
service rendered to the county (State) within the meaning of the exempting provisions of § 502
of the Revenue Act of 1917 and § 500(h) of the Revenue Act of 1918, and within the principle
recognized and applied in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218?”). 
62. Id. at 573. 
63. Id. at 576. 
64. Id. (quotations omitted). 
65. Id. at 577. 
66. Id. at 573. The Court ultimately granted the certificate because it contained “a distinct
and definite question of law” that did not “in form nor in effect ... embrace the whole case.” Id.
at 578. 
67. Id. at 577.
68. 327 U.S. 742 (1946).
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Eastern Oklahoma ordering the remand of a proceeding to the
County Court of Okfuskee County, Oklahoma.”69 Although statutory
law at the time authorized the Supreme Court to order up the case
for decision,70 the Court correctly concluded that doing so would
contravene the Constitution.71 But suppose that the Court had
ordered the entire record sent up so as to decide whether to grant or
dismiss the writ of mandamus. Because the writ was originally
instituted in the circuit court, the circuit court exercised original ju-
risdiction. So by ordering up and deciding the case, the Court would
have impermissibly exercised original jurisdiction over the writ.72
Following similar logic, the Rice Court refused to order up the case;
nonetheless, the Court answered the certified question, which was
“dispositive of the whole case before the circuit court of appeals,”73
and effectively resolved the case as if it had original jurisdiction.
The preceding examples are important in two respects. First, the
Court in Wheeler and Rice correctly concluded that when a lower
court exercising original jurisdiction in a case issues a certificate,
the Court is constitutionally prohibited from ordering up the record
and deciding the entire matter in controversy because doing so
would be an impermissible exercise of original jurisdiction.74 Second,
the Court in both instances found it constitutionally permissible to
answer a certified question that was dispositive of the case pending
before the lower court exercising original jurisdiction.75 If the Court
69. Id. at 744. The proceeding was instituted by the United States “in the circuit court of
appeals by a petition for writ of mandamus, to direct the district court to vacate its judgment
dismissing the Government’s petition for intervention and remanding the proceeding.” Id. at
746. 
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 346 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006)) (“[T]he
Supreme Court may ... require that the entire record in the case be sent up for its
consideration, and thereupon shall decide the whole matter in controversy in the same
manner as if it had been brought there by appeal.”). 
71. See Rice, 327 U.S. at 747 (“The practice established by statute ... of answering
questions certified to this Court, or in some such cases, of deciding the entire controversy on
the whole record, is plainly not within our original jurisdiction.”). 
72. The Court has expressly held that it could not constitutionally exercise original
jurisdiction over a writ of mandamus. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75
(1803). 
73. Rice, 327 U.S. at 747. 
74. See id.; Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 577
(1930).
75. See Rice, 327 U.S. at 747; Wheeler, 281 U.S. at 577. 
2038 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2025
is considered the final arbiter of the Constitution,76 one could claim
sensibly that, because the Court has decided that certification “is
appellate,”77 certification never implicates the Court’s original
jurisdiction. As Part II.C demonstrates, however, this response is
neither entirely accurate nor adequate.
C. The Dual Definitions of Original Jurisdiction
Whether the Court acted constitutionally in answering the
certified questions in Wheeler and Rice depends, in large part, on
how one defines original jurisdiction. This Note argues that there
are two possible definitions, and the application of each definition
leads to a different result. First, the Court exercises original juris-
diction only by deciding both questions of law and fact. Conversely,
the second possible definition would find that the Court exercises
original jurisdiction by acting “as both the first and the final arbiter
of a case.”78 
In applying the first definition, the Court is constitutionally
permitted to answer a certified question of law that is dispositive of
a case pending before a lower court exercising original jurisdiction
as long as the certificate does not also raise a question of fact. Such
cases do not implicate the Court’s original jurisdiction because the
Court, in granting a certificate, is neither permitted nor required to
respond to questions of fact.79 
If, however, the second definition is applied, one must determine
whether the Court acts as the first and final arbiter in answering a
certified question that is dispositive of the case pending before the
lower court exercising original jurisdiction. Although the lower
courts are authorized to issue certificates, they are statutorily
76. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
77. Wheeler, 281 U.S. at 576. 
78. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L.
REV. 665, 694 (1959). 
79. Both statutory law and Supreme Court Rules require that the certified question
implicate law rather than fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006); SUP. CT. R. 19. The Court has
also dismissed certified questions for which the facts were still at issue. E.g., Adams,
Cunningham & Co. v. Jones, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 207, 213 (1838) (“[T]o express an opinion
upon the whole facts of the case, instead of particular points of law growing out of the same;
[is] a practice which is not deemed by the majority of the Court to be correct, under the act of
congress on this subject.”).
2011] CERTIFICATION IN FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE 2039
required to adhere to the Court’s disposition of the certified question
and enter a judgment that comports with the Court’s answer.80
Because the Supreme Court’s answer represents the first legal
judgment of the issues presented in the case, the Court acts as the
first arbiter. Moreover, because the Court’s answer controls the
legal outcome of the case, the Court acts as the final arbiter. Under
this approach, the Court implicitly exercises original jurisdiction.
Alternatively, one could argue that the Court is not the first
arbiter because the lower court, rather than the Supreme Court,
enters the first formal judgment that will legally bind the parties.
Under this approach, the Court does not exercise original jurisdic-
tion. Depending on which approach is adopted, the Court’s actions
are at best constitutionally sound and at worst constitutionally
suspect. This Note need not definitively subscribe to either ap-
proach; given the future unlikelihood that the Court will answer a
certified question issued from a circuit court exercising original
jurisdiction, this discussion is more academic than practical. 
III. THE FUTURE OF CERTIFICATION
Certification, as it is perceived today, is a severely flawed
appellate mechanism without relevance or utility to the federal
courts.81 In order to ensure that certification once again becomes a
viable appellate mechanism, the Supreme Court must be willing to
change its attitude toward—and disposition of—certified questions.
More specifically, the Court must consistently apply the process by
which it grants or dismisses a certificate. This need for consistency
does not mean that the Court should be required to grant every
certified question that conforms to the relatively broad restrictions
contained in the Court’s rules.82 To do so would effectively limit the
Court’s discretion over what cases it reviews,83 a power that the
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (“[T]he Supreme Court may give binding instructions.”). 
81. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 597 (declaring certification “virtually, but not
quite, a dead letter”); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1712 (proclaiming “certification is practically
a dead letter”).
82. SUP. CT. R. 19(1) (requiring that the certificate “contain a statement of the nature of
the case and the facts on which the question or proposition of law arises”). 
83. See Bernard, supra note 8, at 44 (“Certification is viewed as a threat to the Court’s
control of its own docket because it is nominally a nondiscretionary review procedure.”)
(citation omitted).
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Court greatly values. Rather, the Court should establish a more
specific set of restrictions that will help to guide the lower courts in
deciding whether and how to issue certified questions.
The success of this Note’s proposal hinges on the Court’s consis-
tent adherence to its own restrictions. This does not mean that the
Court must cede all of its discretion over whether to answer a
certified question; the Court will still have discretion to make
flexible or strict restrictions on the certification process. But these
restrictions must not be so broad or narrow or ambiguous as to
nullify the usefulness of and need for certification. By consistently
adhering to its own restrictions, the Court will help to maximize the
benefits of certification as an appellate mechanism by guiding the
lower courts in deciding whether and how to issue certified ques-
tions. 
A. Current Restrictions on the Use of Certification
Soon after Congress created certification, the Supreme Court
began restricting its use,84 even though the statute authorizing cer-
tification and the corresponding Supreme Court Rules do not permit
such restrictions.85 For example, the Court has frequently dismissed
certificates because they contained questions of law and fact.86 It
has also refused to answer questions that were hypothetical or
abstract,87 questions that contained more than one question of law,88
questions with answers dependent upon answers to other ques-
tions,89 questions that the Court must reframe,90 questions that
84. See supra Part I.A. 
85. No evidence supports the argument that the Court itself could restrict certification.
For example, Congress requires that the certified question be one “of law” rather than fact.
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). The Court, however, requires that the certificate contain both “a
statement of the nature of the case and the facts on which the question or proposition of law
arises” as well as a “question[ ] or proposition[ ] of law” that is “stated separately and with
precision.” SUP. CT. R. 19(1). These restrictions are not precise enough to guide lower courts
effectively. 
86. Bernard, supra note 8, at 33 (citing Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1934)
(per curiam)). 
87. Id. at 34 (citing NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 27 (1941)).
88. Id. at 33 (citing Quinlan v. Green County, 205 U.S. 410 (1907)). 
89. E.g., Lowden v. Nw. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 163 (1936) (“Question No.
2 is dependent by its terms upon an affirmative answer to question No. 1.”). 
90. E.g., Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1939) (“In this aspect
of the case the certified questions are incapable of categorical answer and the questions which
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require a conclusion as to the weight of the evidence submitted at
trial,91 and questions that require an answer in one set of circum-
stances but a different answer in another set of circumstances.92
Although the preceding examples do not completely delve into the
restrictions that the Supreme Court has imposed on certification,
they do offer a glimpse into the many ways that the Court has
effectively exercised discretion over the types of certificates that it
grants. They also highlight the reality that a lower court must
strictly adhere to the Court’s restrictions lest its certificate be
dismissed. This Note does not object to the use of such restrictions,
for without them, the lower courts could use certification to usurp
the Supreme Court’s control over its own docket.93 The Court,
however, should not use restrictions that are so generally worded or
vaguely defined as to provide little guidance to the lower courts. 
One such ambiguous restriction is the phrase “objectionable
generality,” which has caused the dismissal of many otherwise valid
certificates.94 The phrase’s ambiguity also gives it the potential to be
used as a “catch-all” for the Court to dismiss any or all certificates.
For example, in NLRB v. White Swan Co., the Court dismissed a
certificate because “the questions certified [did] not reflect the
precise conclusions of the Board and the precise findings on which
those conclusions were based,” and the Court qualified its dismissal
by describing the questions as “hav[ing] an ‘objectionable general-
ity.’”95 The Court used the same qualification in other cases in which
it dismissed a certificate.96 Despite this widespread usage, the Court
they suggest can be properly answered only by reframing the questions certified.”). 
91. E.g., Pflueger, 293 U.S. at 57-58 (“The certificate fails to conform to the requirement
that questions submitted must ... not ... involve or imply conclusions or judgment by the Court
upon the effect of facts adduced in the cause.”).
92. E.g., White v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 371 (1931) (“And a question is improper which
is so broad and indefinite as to admit of one answer under one set of circumstances and a
different answer under another.”). 
93. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 597 (finding that the Supreme Court disfavors
unrestricted use of certification because it “would frustrate the Court’s discretionary power
to limit its review to cases it deems worthy” and would give the lower courts the power to
decide via certification what cases the Court will hear). 
94. Bernard, supra note 8, at 33. 
95. 313 U.S. 23, 27 (1941).
96. See, e.g., Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 573 (1939); Triplett v.
Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 648 (1936), overruled by Blonder-Tongue Lab v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971); Pflueger, 293 U.S. at 57-58; White, 282 U.S. at 371; United States v. Mayer,
235 U.S. 55, 66 (1914). 
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has failed to define the phrase in such a way as to effectively guide
lower courts in issuing a certificate. A restriction such as “objection-
able generality,” which provides no instruction for the lower courts
and instills near limitless discretion in the Supreme Court, should
be eliminated in favor of one that provides more precise direction
and guidance. 
B. “Recent” Uses of Certification
In the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has granted only three
certificates.97 In all three cases, the Court answered the certified
question because it presented urgent issues of national public
importance or involved “exceptional circumstances.”98 Of particular
note is United States v. Barnett, in which the Fifth Circuit certified
the following question: whether the Constitution provided a right to
a jury trial to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi
after they were held in contempt of court for failing to obey the
district court’s injunctions.99 The circuit court held that the Gover-
nor had “deliberately prevented” a black student from entering the
all-white University of Mississippi and ordered that the student be
admitted.100 President Kennedy, in order to ensure compliance with
the circuit court’s mandate, dispatched United States Marshals to
accompany the student.101 Although the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly state its reason for granting the certificate, one can reason-
ably conclude that it did so for the very purpose of resolving an
urgent issue of national importance, namely the desegregation of
American public schools. 
After its decision in Barnett, the Court granted a certificate in one
case that presented issues of great importance102 and another
certificate in a case with extraordinary circumstances.103 The Court
97. See supra note 6.
98. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 596 n.3. 
99. 376 U.S. 681, 682 (1964).
100. Id. at 684-85. 
101. Id. at 686. 
102. In Moody v. Albermarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622 (1974) (per curiam), the Court granted
the certificate because “of the importance of the question to the administration of judicial
business in the circuits.” Id. at 624. 
103. The Court granted the certificate in Iran National Airlines Corp. v. Marschalk Co., 453
U.S. 919 (1981), because the certificate concerned issues that the Court resolved in another
case it reviewed during the same Term. 
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thus seems to have implicitly restricted certificates to those cases
presenting such issues, which illustrates that the Court is exercising
discretion over the types of certificates that it grants. But if the
Court is going to place restrictions on the use of certification, it
should do so openly. The Court should clearly define these restric-
tions and grant those certificates that fully comply with its guide-
lines.104 As the most recent use of certification demonstrates,
however, the Court dismisses even those certificates that are
seemingly flawless in structure and substance.105 
C. United States v. Seale: Certification in the 21st Century
In 2007, a federal jury convicted James Ford Seale of kidnapping
and conspiring to kidnap two black teenagers.106 Although the
kidnappings occurred in 1964, over forty years earlier, Seale was not
indicted for those crimes until 2007.107 On appeal of his conviction
to the circuit court, Seale argued that the statute of limitations
barred his indictment.108 The court agreed with Seale and held that
104. In the words of Bernard, “the Court should not reject a validly formed question simply
because the Court feels that other circumstances make it more appropriate for the lower court
to decide the question for itself.” Bernard, supra note 8, at 36. 
105. See Tyler, supra note 8, at 1322 (“[T]he Seale case presented a strong candidate for
certification.”).
106. United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 2008). 
107. Id.
108. Id. At issue in Seale was whether current statutory law established a five-year statute
of limitations period for “non-capital” crimes. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006). Although
Seale was convicted of violating a federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, the statute
does not contain its own statute of limitations. Seale, 542 F.3d at 1034-35. In order to
determine the applicable limitations period, the circuit court looked to 18 U.S.C. § 3281, which
establishes an “unlimited” period for capital offenses, and 18 U.S.C. § 3282, which establishes
a five-year period for noncapital offenses. Id. at 1035. At the time Seale committed the crimes,
the federal kidnapping statute permitted the imposition of the death penalty. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (1964). Because kidnapping was considered a capital crime, the statute contained an
“unlimited” limitations period. See id. § 3281. Four years later, however, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for kidnapping offenses. See
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968). Congress, then, in its revisions to the
federal kidnapping statute, eliminated the death penalty as a punishment. See Act for the
Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, Pub. L. No. 92-539,
86 Stat. 1072 (1972). Given such changes, the issue before the circuit court was whether
Congress’s revisions applied retroactively to kidnapping offenses committed prior to 1972. See
Seale, 542 F.3d at 1036. If the revisions were retroactive, then a kidnapping offense would
qualify as a noncapital crime and thus be subject to a five-year limitations period. If, however,
the revisions were not retroactive, then a kidnapping offense occurring prior to 1972 would
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“the five-year limitations period made applicable to the federal
kidnapping statute by the 1972 amendment applies to this case,
where the alleged offense occurred in 1964 and the indictment was
issued in 2007.”109 Because “[t]he more than forty-year delay clearly
exceeded the limitations period,” the circuit court vacated Seale’s
conviction and acquitted him of the offenses.110 
Following the court’s decision, prosecutors requested that the
Fifth Circuit reconsider the ruling, which it did en banc.111 Because
the Fifth Circuit was evenly divided over the issue, the court
reinstated Seale’s conviction and sentence.112 On Seale’s motion, the
Fifth Circuit “voted to certify the following question of law to the
Supreme Court: What statute of limitations applies to a prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 for a kidnapping offense that occurred in
1964 but was not indicted until 2007?”113 In certifying the question,
the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the case presented “an issue of
first impression and national importance.”114 The court also rea-
soned that a resolution of the legal issue would “give guidance in
future cases” and “establish precedent for filing other criminal
indictments relating to unresolved civil rights era crimes.”115
Despite the historically significant issue and extraordinary circum-
stances that the case presented, the Supreme Court dismissed the
certified question without opinion.116 Justices Stevens and Scalia,
however, dissented from the Court’s disposition.117 
In his statement, which Justice Scalia joined, Justice Stevens
asserted that the certificate presented “a pure question of law” that
was “narrow, debatable, and important.”118 In other words, the
certificate was structurally and substantively flawless: the question
was sufficiently narrow, its answer sufficiently disputed, and the
be a capital crime subject to an “unlimited” limitations period. 
109. Seale, 542 F.3d at 1045. 
110. Id.
111. United States v. Seale, 550 F.3d 377, 377 (5th Cir. 2008). 
112. United States v. Seale, 570 F.3d 650, 650-51 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
113. United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
114. Id. at 571. 
115. Id. at 571. The dissenters argued that certification would (1) waste the circuit court’s
and Supreme Court’s time, (2) likely fail given the Supreme Court’s opposition to its use, and
(3) be imprudent because a panel of the circuit court could “ultimately reverse the conviction.”
Id. at 572 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
116. Seale v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 12 (2009). 
117. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question). 
118. Id. at 12-13. 
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subject sufficiently extraordinary and important to require the
Court’s timely and quick resolution. Concurring with the circuit
court’s reason for issuing the certificate, Justice Stevens argued that
“[t]his certificate ... may well determine the outcome of a number of
cases of ugly racial violence remaining from the 1960s.”119 Of
particular importance is Justice Stevens’s conclusion that the
“unusual circumstances” of the certificate warranted its grant.120
This reasoning follows the Court’s implicit rule of deciding only
those certificates that involve extraordinary circumstances.121
However, despite the certificate’s apparent flawlessness, Justice
Stevens raised the question of whether certification was appropriate
given the Court’s restrictions on certificates that implicate intra-
circuit splits.122 In responding to this issue, Justice Stevens argued
that there would be “no benefit and significant cost to postponing
the [certified] question’s resolution.”123 Although such a response is
a fitting reason for why certification is generally useful, it does not
adequately address the preceding issue: whether the Court properly
dismissed the certified question because it implicated an intra-
circuit split. If the Supreme Court should adhere to its own
restrictions on certification, then Justice Stevens should have
responded with the following: “Despite the restrictions that the
Court has placed on certificates that implicate intra-circuit splits,
this restriction is inapplicable in the present case.” Because Seale
concerned a split among all the judges on the Fifth Circuit, rather
than a split among the three-judge panels within the circuit, this
Note argues that the certificate at issue in Seale does not implicate
an intra-circuit split.124 Therefore, the Court could have granted the
119. Id. at 12. Circuit judges have disputed this claim given the uncertainty that the “issue
may bear on two dozen or so cold cases of ugly racial violence remaining from the early
1960s.” Seale, 577 F.3d at 572 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
120. Seale, 130 S. Ct. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question).
121. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
122. Seale, 130 S. Ct. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question).
123. Id.
124. If one defines an intra-circuit split as one in which a circuit court panel renders a
decision that is different from an earlier decision rendered by a different circuit court panel
concerning the same or similar question of law, then Seale would not rise to the level of an
intra-circuit split because only one circuit court panel had divided over the question of law at
issue in Seale before the case was reheard en banc. See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S.
901, 902 (1957) (dismissing a certificate because it involved an intra-circuit split in which a
“question certified by the Court of Appeals was decided by another panel of that court less
than a year and a half before the present certification”). 
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certificate without contradicting the restrictions it has imposed on
certification. 
D. Maximizing the Benefits of Certification 
The Court’s disposition in Seale is noteworthy for three additional
reasons: (1) it demonstrates that, two hundred years after its enact-
ment, certification is still used as an appellate mechanism; (2) it
shows that certification still has supporters in the Court’s member-
ship; and (3) it reveals that certification offers significant benefits,
including the timely and efficient resolution125 of issues of national
importance126 and the conservation of scarce judicial resources. Such
benefits, however, cannot be realized unless and until the Court is
willing to change its approach to certification. 
As an example of the benefits that can be realized, consider the
procedural facts of Seale. The defendant in Seale lost in the district
court, won on appeal in a three-judge circuit court panel, and then
lost after the circuit court, sitting en banc, split on the question of
law. The circuit court then certified the question to the Supreme
Court,127 which dismissed the certificate without opinion.128 Because
the circuit court split on the question of law, the defendant’s con-
viction and sentence were reinstated and subsequently upheld
by a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit.129 Defendant appealed to
the Supreme Court, which denied the petition for certiorari.130
Accordingly, no precedent exists to guide lower courts in deciding
the same question of law. This void will generate additional appeals,
expense, and uncertainty in other circuits. Justice Stevens’s obser-
vation has been validated: if the certificate was granted in the first
place, then the Court would have not only resolved a legal issue of
national public importance, it would have saved for itself and the
125. See Tyler, supra note 8, at 1325 (“[C]ertification often results in more efficient
resolution of cases.”). 
126. See id. at 1326 (“[C]ertification allows lower court judges themselves to inform the
Court—directly and formally—that an issue is important, recurring, and in need of its
resolution.”). 
127. United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2009).
128. Seale v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 12 (2009).
129. United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 472, 497 (5th Cir. 2010). 
130. Seale v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 163 (2010).
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lower courts a significant amount of resources that will be spent liti-
gating and appealing the same question of law in other circuits.131
Despite these substantial benefits, scholars have criticized certi-
fication because it invokes the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction and
thereby increases the Court’s docket.132 Although certification was
perceived to be a nondiscretionary appellate mechanism,133 the
Court has exercised tremendous discretion in granting or dismissing
certified questions.134 A way exists, however, to successfully limit
the use of certification and ensure the Court’s control over its own
docket: the Court can impose reasonable and well-defined restric-
tions on the use of certification that will effectively guide the lower
courts in deciding whether and how to issue a certificate. In ex-
change for having greater control over the types of certificates that
it grants, the Court should also be willing to adhere to its own
restrictions and to grant those certificates that are structurally and
substantively flawless. Although the Court has the discretion to
make these restrictions rigid, flexible, narrow, or broad, it should
use this discretion carefully. The restrictions should not be so rigid
or narrow as to nullify certification, nor should they be so flexible or
broad as to be ineffective in guiding the lower courts. One way to
strike this balance would be to promulgate the following rule, which
is adapted from the current language of Supreme Court Rule 19: 
A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court one
pure question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction
for the proper decision of a case. The certificate shall contain a
131. See Seale, 130 S. Ct. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certified question)
(“I see no benefit and significant cost to postponing the question’s resolution.... In these
unusual circumstances, certification can serve the interests not only of legal clarity but also
of prosecutorial economy and ‘the proper administration and expedition of judicial business.’”
(quoting Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957))); see also Bernard, supra note
8, at 49 (“[T]he procedure permits many cases to be resolved finally at the court of appeals
level while avoiding the time and expense of petitioning the Supreme Court, a burden both
on the litigants and the high court itself.”); George & Guthrie, supra note 6, at 1451 (“[T]he
Court may allow for more timely and cost-effective resolution of substantial cases by
intervening to answer a limited question prior to the circuit court’s complete determination
of all issues posed by an appeal.”). 
132. See Bernard, supra note 8, at 44 (“Certification is viewed as a threat to the Court’s
control of its own docket because it is nominally a nondiscretionary review procedure.”); Moore
& Vestal, supra note 8, at 42.
133. See supra Part I.C. 
134. See supra note 6.
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statement of the nature of the case and the facts on which the
question or proposition of law arises. The question or proposition
of law shall (1) be disputed, (2) implicate extraordinary circum-
stances or important national or public interests, and (3) be
stated with precision. No question or proposition of law shall
arise from a conflict among the panels of a circuit court. A
certified question may be issued by a panel of a circuit court
where there is a division among two or more circuit courts or,
absent a conflict, by a circuit court sitting en banc.135 
Although these guidelines allow a degree of interpretive freedom,
they will limit the Court in dismissing those certificates that follow
these structural and substantive requirements and guide the lower
courts in issuing certificates. 
In applying these revisions to the facts in Seale, the Court would
have been hard-pressed to dismiss the certified question at issue in
the case.136 These revisions, therefore, not only respond to those
instances in which the Court has incorrectly dismissed a flawless
certificate, they also help to merge into one authoritative source the
restrictions that the Court has imposed on certification. If Congress
no longer believes that certification has value as a federal appellate
mechanism, it must repeal it so that the circuit courts no longer rely
on it.137 If, however, certification still offers some benefits,138 the
Court must revise and reevaluate its approach in reviewing
135. Cf. SUP. CT. R. 19.
136. The certificate in Seale contained a statement of the case and facts as well as one pure
and precise question of law: whether the five-year limitations period that was appended to the
federal kidnapping statute in 1972 applies if the defendant’s alleged offenses occurred in 1964,
approximately forty-three years before the indictment. See United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d
566, 571 (5th Cir. 2009). The answer to this question is disputed, see id. (“[T]he evenly divided
en banc court was simply unable to reach a decision.”), and the certificate implicated both
extraordinary circumstances, see id. (“The nominal affirmance of Seale’s life sentence by an
equally divided en banc court is the type of rare instance where certification is appropriate.”),
and important national or public interests, see id. (“This discrete legal issue needs to be
resolved by the Supreme Court in order to give guidance in future [civil rights era] cases.”).
The certified question, moreover, did not arise from an intra-circuit split, see supra note 124
and accompanying text, and was issued by a circuit court sitting en banc.
137. Although Congress was given the opportunity to repeal certification in 1988 when it
“eliminated a provision allowing for more direct appeals to the Supreme Court,” it refused to
do so. Nielson, supra note 8, at 485 (citation omitted). 
138. As Justice Holmes once commented, “[Certified] questions are to be encouraged as a
mode of disposing of cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way.” Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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certificates. Only then can these benefits be realized. Otherwise,
certification will remain an appellate mechanism with little
meaning and substance. 
CONCLUSION
This Note examined a relatively unknown appellate mechanism
that has been described as “a dead letter.”139 But as the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Seale demonstrates,
certification is not dead. Although the Court dismissed the certified
question in Seale, the fact that the Fifth Circuit even issued a
certificate and the fact that Justices Stevens and Scalia argued
against the Court’s dismissal are testaments to the “down-but-not-
out” position of certification in federal appellate procedure. Whether
certification becomes the viable appellate mechanism that it once
was depends on (1) clearly delineated rules that will guide the lower
courts in deciding whether and how to issue their certificates, and
(2) the Court’s strict adherence to these rules. In reassessing the
Supreme Court’s role in the certification process, this Note’s
proposed revisions will help to maximize the benefits of certification
and reinforce its value as an appellate mechanism. 
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